We determine the semantic security capacity for quantum wiretap channels. We extend methods for classical channels to quantum channels to demonstrate that a strongly secure code guarantees a semantically secure code with the same secrecy rate. Furthermore, we show how to 1 transform a non-secure code into a semantically secure code by means of biregular irreducible functions (BRI functions). We analyze semantic security for classical quantum channels and for quantum channels.
transform a non-secure code into a semantically secure code by means of biregular irreducible functions (BRI functions). We analyze semantic security for classical quantum channels and for quantum channels.
Introduction
We investigate the transmission of messages from a sending to a receiving party through a wiretap channel. In this model, there is a third party called an eavesdropper who must not be allowed to know the information sent from the sender to the intended receiver. The wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner in [52] . A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classicalquantum wiretap channel.
The secrecy capacity of the classical-quantum wiretap channel subject to the strong security criterion has been determined in [26, 23] . Strong security means that given a uniformly distributed message sent through the channel, the eavesdropper shall obtain no information about it. This criterion goes back to [24, 36] and it is the most common secrecy criterion in classical and quantum information theory.
In the present paper, however, a stronger security requirement will be applied, called semantic security (and defined in Section 3). With this, the eavesdropper gains no information regardless of the message distribution. This criterion was introduced to information theory from cryptography [11] , motivated by the analogous security criterion of the same name. It is equivalent to message indistinguishability, where the eavesdropper cannot distinguish whether the given cipher text is an encryption of any two messages (which can even be chosen by the eavesdropper). Aside from being the minimum security requirement in practical applications, semantic security is also necessary in the security of identification codes [4] . Because in identification pairs of messages The seed s has to be known to the sender and receiver beforehand or it is generated by the sender and transmitted to the intended receiver through the channel. are compared to each other, to make the code secure, any two messages must be indistinguishable at the eavesdropper [5] . Message indistinguishability is thus necessary to construct secure identification codes, and the semantic security achieved in this paper can thus be used to construct secure identification codes via classical-quantum channels [20] .
In Section 4, we show that we can convert a code for the classical-quantum channel which has a small leakage with respect to the strong security criterion into a code which has a small leakage with respect to the semantic security leakage. This can be done by restricting the message set to a suitable large subset (which in general depends on the channel), just like for classical wiretap channels [48] . For the case where security is measured in terms of the trace norm instead of the Holevo quantity, the analogous statement was shown before for classical-quantum channels in [40] . However, these proofs are merely existence statements and give no clue as to how to find the large message subset which provides semantic security. We extend the results for the classical-quantum channel in Section 3.4 to quantum channels with the environment entangled with the quantum system, which is completely under the control of a constant eavesdropper.
In Section 5, we show how this capacity can be achieved by modularly cor-recting transmission error and amplifying privacy in separate components of the code, as for the case of strong secrecy [29] . These modular codes for the classical-quantum wiretap channel are constructed concatenating an ordinary transmission code for the channel from the sender to the intended receiver with an additional security component. Furthermore, the additional security component is independent of the channel, as for the case of explicit strong secrecy constructions. The first such security components used in the literature were universal hash functions [12, 29] , used to achieve strong secrecy. The specific security components we use, called biregular irreducible functions (BRI functions), were introduced in [48] in the context of classical wiretap channels. A modular code for the classical-quantum wiretap channel is illustrated in Figure 2 . If a transmission code from the sender to the intended receiver with input/output set C is given, then a BRI function that is to be used with this transmission code has the form f : S × C → N . Here, S is a seed set, and the set M of messages of the modular wiretap code is an explicitly given subset of N . To use this modular code, the sender and the intended receiver have to share a seed s ∈ S, chosen uniformly at random from S. Given any message m ∈ M and seed s, the sender randomly chooses a preimage c ∈ C, satisfying f s (c) = m. Since the intended receiver knows s, he can recover m if no transmission error occurs. Thus the task of establishing reliable transmission is entirely due to the transmission code, while the BRI function's responsibility is to ensure semantic security. The above modular construction was already shown to achieve the secrecy capacity of classical wiretap channels with semantic security in [48] . An alternative to BRI functions was proposed by Hayashi and Matsumoto [31] . Their example, however, requires a seed which is longer than that which is necessary for the best-known BRI function.
We emphasize that the seed is not a secret key, since we do not require it to be unknown to the eavesdropper. The main part of the analysis of the above modular codes assumes that the seed is given (non-securely) to the sender and the intended receiver by common randomness. However, it is a general result for codes with common randomness that if the error probability and security leakage decrease sufficiently fast in block length, the seed can be reused a small number of times. Modular codes constructed using BRI functions show this behavior. Therefore, no more than a negligible amount of rate is lost if the sender generates the seed and transmits it to the intended receiver, and then reuses the seed a small number of times. In particular, any rate which is achievable with a seed given by common randomness is also achievable with a sender-generated seed.
Moreover we would like to emphasize that the semantic secrecy for classicalquantum channels is much harder than for classical channels. Roughly speaking, two different inputs not only result in two different random variables, but the outputs have also different eigenspace, so it is more difficult to make them indistinguishable. For instance, Corollary 5.10 delivers a bound which is technically weaker than the classical version of [48] (see below).
Basic Notations and Definitions
The content of this section can be found in most books covering the basics of matrix analysis and quantum information, see, for example, [13, 37, 49] . For a finite set X , we denote the set of probability distributions on X by P (X ) and with E the expectation value. For a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H, we denote the set of linear operators on H with L(H). Let ρ, σ ∈ L(H) be Hermitian operators in L(H). We say ρ ≥ σ, or equivalently σ ≤ ρ, if ρ − σ is positive-semidefinite. The (convex) space of density operators on H is defined as
where 0 H is the null matrix on H. and for a discrete random variable X, on a finite set X we denote the Shannon entropy of X by
where we use in both definitions and throughout this paper the convention that the logarithm "log" is taken in base 2. We denote with h(ν)
, the binary entropy. Let ρ and σ be two positive semi-definite operators not necessarily in S(H). The quantum relative entropy between ρ and σ is defined as
if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), and D(ρ σ) := ∞ otherwise. For α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞), the Rényi relative entropy between ρ and σ is defined as
, and D α (ρ σ) := ∞ otherwise. The Rényi relative entropy satisfies the ordering relation
for any density operators ρ and σ, and any α ≤ α ′ (cf. [7] ). Furthermore, it holds (cf. [7] ), that
The Rényi relative entropies also satisfy monotonicity under quantum channels (cf. [49] ), namely under completely positive trace preserving linear maps Λ
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces H and H ′ , a quantum channel N (ρ) is represented by a completely-positive trace-preserving linear map N : L(H) → L(H ′ ), which accepts input quantum states in S(H) and produces output quantum states in S(H ′ ). Quantum channels will be treated in Section 3.4, building on the results for classical-quantum channels. The case of classical-quantum channels will be treated in Sections 3 to 5. For a finitedimensional complex Hilbert space H, a classical-quantum channel is a map V : X → S(H), x → V (x). In order to use the same notation common in classical information theory, for a measurement operator 0 ≤ D ≤ id H , we define the following notation
notice that this notation, at least for the quantum state, is also common in the C * algebra literature, where quantum states are considered functionals on hermitian operators. For a probability distribution P and a classical-quantum channel V on X , the Holevo χ quantity, or Holevo information, is defined as
The Holevo information is also the mutual information between the input and the output. Namely, let H X be a |X |-dimensional Hilbert space with a set of orthonormal basis {|x : x ∈ X }, and X be the random variable on X with distribution P , then the Holevo information is the quantum mutual information I(X ∧ V (X)) for the state
The Holevo quantity can also be written as the expected value of the quantum relative entropy as a random variable of the states from the product states of their marginals, namely if we denote the marginal with
it is easy to check that the following holds
We then denote the conditional information of the quantum part conditioned on the classical one as
Strong and Semantic security
In this section we introduce the channels, the codes, and the capacities which we will study, as well as the definitions for strong secrecy and semantic security with and without common randomness. In Section 5 we will show how to explicitly build such codes using modular coding schemes which require common randomness. For now, let us define the channels of interest. The intended receiver accesses the output of the first channel W , and the eavesdropper observes the output of the second channel V in the pair.
Codes
A code is created by the sender and the intended receiver beforehand. The sender uses the encoder to map the message that he wants to send to a channel input, while the intended receiver uses the family of decoder operators on the channel output to perform a measurement and decode the message. In all the definitions below let us fix n ∈ N, finite sets M and X , finite quantum systems H and H ′ , and a classical-quantum wiretap channel (W, V ) from X to H and H ′ . Just like for the notation P V for a channel V : X → S(H) and a probability distribution P over X , we define EV for a classical channel E :
Notice that now, for a measurement operator D, we have two ways of writing the output probability given m, namely E m V (D) and EV (D|m). where the stochastic encoder E : M → P(X n ) is a classical channel, and the decoder operators {D m : m ∈ M} form a sub-POVM on H ⊗n . We assume that the POVM is completed by associating the measurement operator id H − m∈M D m to the the error/abortion symbol of the decoder.
The (maximum) error (probability) of C is defined as
where D c m := id H ⊗n − D m . For any random variable M over the messages M, the leakage of C with respect to M is defined as
Observe that we consider codes with stochastic encoders as opposed to deterministic codes. In a deterministic code the encoder is deterministic, namely in Definition 3.2 instead of a family of probability distributions {E m } m∈M , the encoder consists of a family of n-length strings of symbols {c m } m∈M ⊆ X n .The deterministic encoder can be obtained as a special case of the stochastic encoder by imposing that every probability distribution E m is deterministic. For message transmission over an ordinary classical-quantum channel, and even for the most general case of robust message transmission over an arbitrarily-varying classical-quantum channel, it is enough to use deterministic encoders [2, 21] . However, for secret message transmission over wiretap channels, we need to use stochastic encoders [23, 26] . Now we will define the coding scheme where both the sender and the receiver have access to common randomness. We do not require this common randomness to be secure against eavesdropping. Effectively, the common randomness simply decides which among a set of classical-quantum codes from Definition 3.2,will be used. For any random variable M over the messages independent of S, the leakage of {C s } with respect to M is defined as
The definition of leakage reflects the possibility that the common randomness is known perfectly to the eavesdropper, as the leakage is also computed against the common randomness. Observe, that due to the independence of S and M , the leakage can be written as conditional mutual (or Holevo) information between the message M and the output conditioned on the seed S:
The random seed should not be confused with the randomness of the stochastic encoder. In the stochastic encoder, only the sender, but not the receiver, randomly chooses a code word to encode a message m according to the probability distribution E m . In the subsequent definitions of achievable rates, the receiver should be able to decode m even when he only knows E m , but not which code word is actually chosen by the sender. In contrast, a randomly chosen seed s determines a stochastic encoder E s for the sender and a set of decoder operators {D s m : m ∈ M} for the receiver. Correctness is required only for the case that s is known to both the sender and the receiver and that they use the encoder and decoder prescribed by s.
Capacities
Next we define the strong and semantic secrecy rates which can be achieved by the codes introduced in the previous subsection. A good code reliably conveys private information to the intended receiver such that the wiretapper's knowledge of the transmitted information can be kept arbitrarily small in terms of the corresponding secrecy criterion.
Definition 3.4 (Strong secrecy).
where U is the uniform distribution on M. R is an achievable strong secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an (n, R − ǫ, ǫ) strong secrecy code. The strong secrecy capacity C strong (W, V ) is the supremum of all achievable strong secrecy rates of (W, V ).
Definition 3.5 (Common-randomness strong secrecy). A common-randomness code
where U is the uniform distribution on M. R is an achievable common-randomness strong secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a (n, R−ǫ, ǫ) common-randomness strong secrecy code. The common-randomness strong secrecy capacity C strong (W, V ; cr) is the least upper bound of all achievable common-randomness strong secrecy rates of (W, V ).
Since codes without common randomness are just a special case of commonrandomness codes, we have by construction that
Strong secrecy, i.e., the requirements of Equations (7) and (10), is the secrecy criterion which has been used mostly in information-theoretic security until the introduction of semantic security in [11] . It provides secrecy if the message random variable is uniformly distributed. Inspired by cryptography, [11] introduced semantic security, where the eavesdropper shall not obtain any information regardless of the probability distribution of the message. We next state the corresponding definitions. Definition 3.6 (Semantic secrecy).
where M is any random variable over the messages M. R is an achievable semantic secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a (n, R − ǫ, ǫ) semantic secrecy code. The semantic secrecy capacity C sem (W, V ) is the supremum of all achievable semantic secrecy rates of (W, V ).
Definition 3.7 (Common-randomness semantic secrecy). A common-randomness code
where M is any random variable over the messages M. R is an achievable common-randomness semantic secrecy rate if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a (n, R − ǫ, ǫ) commonrandomness semantic secrecy code. The common-randomness semantic secrecy capacity C sem (W, V ; cr) is the supremum of all achievable commonrandomness semantic secrecy rates of (W, V ).
Just like for strong secrecy, and due to common-randomness codes being more general, we have by construction
Similarly, the semantic secrecy condition is stronger, meaning that any semantically secure capacity achieving code family, is also a strongly secure code family and thus
Since the maxima in Equation (13) and Equation (16) range over all possible message distributions, semantic security in particular implies message indistinguishability. This means that even if the message random variable can only assume one of two possible values known to the eavesdropper, the eavesdropper cannot distinguish between these two messages. This is not implied by strong secrecy alone.
Notice that since the leakage of the common-randomness codes in Equation (3) is computed against the state at the wiretap and the seed, bounding the leakage in the common-randomness capacities implies bounding the information about the key carried by the seed. Thus the common randomness is not required to be secure against eavesdropping, since the Equations (10) and (16) impose that the seed carries no information, and thus it is considered to be public.
Derandomization
Derandomization is a standard and widely used technique in information theory, already used by Ahlswede in [1] . As a final result in this section, we apply the derandomization technique to good common-randomness semantic-security codes, namely we construct a semantic-security code without common randomness using a transmission code and a common-randomness semantic-security code with appropriate error scaling. These derandomized codes will essentially be able to produce the common randomness needed to run the common-randomness codes using an asymptotically small number of copies of the channel. The proof mimics the classical case showed in [48] .
A simple idea that uses too many channels to generate the seed, however, is to alternate transmission codes and common-randomness semantic-secrecy codes, use the transmission code to generate the seed, and use it only once in the common randomness semantic-security code. Depending on the size of the required seed, this may result in too many channels used just for the seed. The solution is to simply reuse the seed, thus reducing the total size of |S| by sharing the same s ∈ S for N common-randomness codes. We thus need to build (N +1)tuple of codewords as the new codewords. Each tuple is a composition of a first codeword that generates the common-randomness and N common randomnessassisted codewords to transmit the messages to the intended receiver. We start by defining such codes. 
We define their (n ′ + nN, |M| N ) derandomized codeC to be the code (without common randomness), such that for any messagem ∈M
• the encoder samples from a uniform seed S and then, conditioned on the values s, uses the Kronecker product encoder E ′ s · E s m , thus
• the decoder for the message is the coarse graining of decoders over s
Note that the random seed in the derandomizing code becomes part of the stochastic encoding process of the code. As we expect, the error and the leakage of the derandomizing code is not worse than the sum of the errors and leakage of all the codes used in the process. This can be easily proved by simply applying the standard techniques (cf. [3, 16] ) for derandomization with uniform distributed inputs on derandomization with arbitrary distributed inputs. Notice that the standard proof of security (cf. [16] ) is nothing more than applying the quantum data processing inequality (cf. [49] ) when we consider the derandomizing code as a function of its first part. Thus this argument works for any inputs distribution. Nevertheless we give a proof for the sake of completeness. Lemma 3.9. Let C ′ be an (n ′ , 1 n ′ log |S|, ǫ ′ ) transmission code, and let {C s } s∈S be an (n, R, ǫ) common-randomness semantic-secrecy code. Letn := n ′ + nN , then the N -derandomized codeC is an (n, nN n R, ǫ ′ + ǫN ) semantic-secrecy code. Proof. The N -derandomized code has size |M| N , thus the rate is N log |M|/n ≥ nN R/n. We just need to bound the error and leakage of the new code.
For the error ofC, by standard argument we have that for everym ∈M
and thus e(C,n) ≤ ǫ ′ + ǫN . For the leakage, since we are reusing the seed and the seed is shared via the transmission code, a uniform seed does not map a random message to a uniformly random input to the channel. Thus we need to reduce the security to the security of the single codes. Recalling that the the Holevo information is actually mutual information, by data processing and Equation (4), we have
Since the message encoder is a Kronecker product of encoders, and the channel is memoryless, we have H E S M V ⊗nN = H E S Mi V ⊗n , and thus
and the proof is concluded.
Notice that the argument works for any distribution ofM , the single uses of the semantic-secrecy code do not need to have independent messages. This is usually a point of difference with the derandomization techniques used for strong secrecy. In strong secrecyM is only required to be uniformly distributed, which makes each M i already independent and also uniformly distributed. This allows for an easier but not fully general argument, since the leakage of the derandomized code is actually equal to the sum of the leakages of the single internal codes.
We will use the above in Section 5 to derandomize the explicit constructions of semantic secrecy codes.
Quantum Channels
The results from classical secret message transmission over classical-quantum channels can usually be carried over to fully quantum channels. Moreover, this is optimal, in the sense that it is usually enough to just prepend a classicalquantum preprocessing channel to many copies of the quantum channel and then use the coding for the resulting classical-quantum channel. The extension to quantum channels reduces to simply proving Corollary 4.2, which is straightforward and uses quite general arguments. More precisely, since the encoding of classical messages for any quantum channel will need to map the classical messages to quantum states, the resulting effect at the sender is again a classical quantum channel, and thus we can reduce the analysis to what we have done so far for classical-quantum channels.
For classical and classical-quantum channels, the wiretap channel must be given, in the sense that an assumption must be made about the output seen at the eavesdropper, simply because the worst case scenario, that the eavesdropper receives a noiseless copy of the input, is always physically possible. This is not the case for quantum channels, where one of the aspects of no-cloning implies that a copy of the input quantum state cannot be made, and the worst case interaction with the environment can be deduced from the noise in the channel. Since there is a limit to the information that it is leaked to the environment, there is thus also a limit to the information of the eavesdropper, and we can then remove any assumption in that respect, and identify the eavesdropper with the environment [10, 26] .
Let now P and Q be quantum systems, and let W be a quantum channel. We assume, as usual in the quantum setting, the worst case scenario, namely that the environment E is completely under the control of the eavesdropper, which is in contrast with the classical and classical-quantum setting where this worst case scenario does not allow for secrecy. This automatically defines the wiretap channel (W, V ) for any given quanutm channel W to the intended receiver. However the results below work in general for any allowed pair of quantum channels (W, V ) on the same input. Definition 3.10. A quantum wiretap channel from a sender P to a receiver Q with eavesdropper E is a pair of complementary channels (W, V ), where W :
Remark 3.11. Without the assumption that the eavesdropper might have full access to the environment, the treatment of the semantic secrecy capacity is still the same. In this case the wiretap channel must be specified explicitly as (W, V ), where both W and V are quantum channels. However not all pairs are allowed, as V must be a channel that can be recovered from the environment. The generalization is that W and V must be of the form W = tr ER (U ρU * ) and V = tr QR (U ρU * ), where now the isometry U : H P → H Q ⊗ H E ⊗ H R maps to three systems, the intended receiver, the eavesdropper, and an environment not in possession of the eavesdropper.
We can transmit both classical and quantum information over quantum channels. For the transmission of classical information via a quantum channel, we first have to convert a classical message into a quantum state. We assume that the states produced in the input system are constructed depending on the value of x ∈ X , where X is a finite set of letters. Let thus F : X → S(H P ) be this classical-quantum channel. The composition with a quantum channel W defines the classical-quantum channel W • F : X → S(H Q ); to keep a consistent notation we define F W ≡ W • F . With this notation, the definitions present only minimal changes in comparison to the classical-quantum wiretap channels above. A code for the quantum channels now simply needs to input quantum states instead of classical values. The error of C is defined as
The leakage of a message random variable M over M is defined as
where V is the complementary channel to the environment.
The rates and capacities can then be defined exactly as is done for classicalquantum channels. Since we will use these definitions only briefly in Corollary 4.2, we limit ourselves to directly defining the capacities.
Definition 3.13. The strong secrecy capacity C strong (W ) is the largest real number such that for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set X and an (n,
where U is the uniform random variable over M. 
e(C, n) < ǫ ,
Notice that the choice of environment channel does not affect the definitions of capacity. Let V and V ′ be two distinct complementary channels to W , then V ′ and V are equivalent in the sense that there is a partial isometry U such that for all input states ρ ∈ S(H P ) we have V ′ (ρ) = U * V (ρ)U [39, 33] . The action of the partial isometry is reversible and thus the leakage is the same (being a mutual information, which is non-increasing under local operations). Therefore the security criteria in Definitions 3.13 and 3.14 does not depend on the choice of complementary channel.
With the definitions in place, the following sections are dedicated to prove our results. In Section 4 we prove that we can change any strong secrecy capacity achieving codes into semantic secrecy capacity achieving codes. However the result is non constructive, which is why in Section 5 we provide a semi-constructive proof where we concatenate functions to suitable transmission codes to convert them into semantic secrecy capacity achieving codes. The final section is dedicated to generalizing the results from classical quantum channels to quantum channels.
Semantic Secrecy Capacity
In this section we prove that the two semantic secrecy capacities of classicalquantum channels are equal
where "w" stands for wiretap, and the maximum is taken over finite input sets M, input probability distributions P on M, and classical channels E : M → P (X n ). C w (W, V ) was first proven in [26] to equal the strong secrecy capacity of the classical-quantum wiretap channel. The result was extended in [17] to the common-randomness strong secrecy capacity as a particular case of arbitrarilyvarying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Namely, we have
For now we will not actually use the explicit expression of C w . Since a semantically secure code is always also strongly secure, the converse theorems for strong secrecy are also strong converses for semantic secrecy, as displayed schematically in Figure 3 . Thus, we only need to prove C sem (W, V ) ≥ C strong (W, V ). In Theorem 4.1 we prove this, and show that we can convert a strong secrecy code into a semantic secrecy code without asymptotic rate loss.
Theorem 4.1. Let (W, V ) be a classical-quantum wiretap channel. With the same notation as in Equation (24), we have
Proof. As it is already explained and displayed in Figure 3 , we only need to prove the direct part. Moreover we do not need to prove the direct part explicitly, but it suffices to show that
For this, we are going to take a code which achieves strong secrecy capacity. This code has asymptotically small mutual information between uniform messages and the wiretapper. We consider a message subset, for which we will keep only half of the messages which have the lowest distinguishability. Then we upper bound the mutual information between any distribution on this subset and the wiretapper.
Inspection of the proof of [26, Theorem 1] shows that all achievable strong secrecy rates of (W, V ), in particular C strong (W, V ), are achievable in a stronger sense, namely, with exponentially decreasing error probability and leakage. Formally, this means that for any ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, there exists an (n, |M n |) strong secrecy code C n satisfying
where U n is the uniform distribution over M n , and E is the encoder of the code. We may also assume that n is large enough for
to hold (this follows immediately from the definition of C strong (W, V ) as the largest achievable strong secrecy rate).
We start by first showing that there is a subcode C ′ n of size M ′ n ≥ M n /2 such that all messages are close to each other in trace norm in terms of the output distribution they generate at the wiretapper. We will denote the output states and their average at the wiretap as
Now let H Mn be a |M n |-dimensional Hilbert space with a basis {|m : m ∈ M n }. We define the following two quantum states
so that, as per Equation (1), we can write the Holevo information using the relative entropy as χ(U n ; EV ⊗n ) = D(σ µ ⊗ ρ). By the Quantum Pinsker inequality [30] we have σ − µ ⊗ ρ 2 1 ≤ D(σ µ ⊗ ρ) · 2 ln 2 = χ(U n ; EV ⊗n ) · 2 ln 2 ≤ 2 −nδ+1 ln 2 and thus
Thus there exists a M ′ n ⊂ M n such that |M ′ n | ≥ 1 2 |M n | and
for all m ∈ M ′ n (otherwise, if such a set did not exist, then Equation (27) could not be true). By restricting the original code C to the message subset M ′ , we obtain a subcode X ′ .
We just proved that we can construct a large subcode X ′ out of the strong secrecy code C such that X ′ satisfies pairwise message indistinguishability in terms of the trace norm distance. Next, we translate message indistinguishability into semantic security via standard arguments. Let P be any probability distribution P on the new message set M ′ n . We need to bound
where E ′ is the encoder of the subcode C ′ . For this we use the continuity properties of the mutual information. According the tight bound proven in [45] , for any state σ ′ on systems A and B with marginal µ ′ on A of finite dimension d, and any state ρ ′ on B of arbitrary dimension, it holds
where
, with h the binary entropy. We apply this to the Holevo quantity from Equation (29) that we want to bound, which is the mutual information of the state
From Equation (28) we directly have a bound on ǫ
and thus by Equation (30) we have
By (25), the right-hand side of (31) tends to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, so we can choose a 0 < δ ′ < δ such that
This gives us the desired upper bound on Equation (29). Since δ ′ < δ and e(C ′ n , n) ≤ e(C n , n), we also have
Finally, since M ′ n contains at least half of the messages of M n , we have
Equations (32) to (34) together show that by constructing C ′ n from C n , one loses no rate asymptotically, while the C ′ n are semantic secrecy codes with exponentially decreasing leakage and error. In particular, C strong (W, V ) is an achievable rate for semantic security. This proves the claim C sem (W, V ) ≥ C strong (W, V ).
Quantum Channels
Let W now be a quantum channel, thus defining the quantum wiretap channel to be the complementary channel to the environment. Just like the case of the classical-quantum channel, the strong and semantic secrecy capacities are equal. This time, rather than transforming a strong secrecy code into a semantic secrecy code, we simply generalize the result from classical-quantum channels to quantum channels, in the same way it was done for strong secrecy in [26] .
In [26] it was proven that the strong secrecy capacity C strong (W ) can be computed using the following multi-letter formula.
where V is the channel to the environment defined by W . The supremum is taken over all chosen finite sets X , classical/quantum channels F : X → S(H ⊗n P ), and probability distributions P on X . Notice how the classical-quantum channel is allowed to output entangled states between the inputs of the channels.
Just like for classical-quantum channels, any semantic secrecy code is also a strong secrecy code, and the strong secrecy capacity is a converse on the semantic secrecy capacity. Again, we only need the achievability proof. The achievability of this rate follows directly from the achievability of the wiretap capacity for classical-quantum channels. Since the proof is actually independent of the structure of the secrecy criterion, the same proof for strong secrecy also works for semantic secrecy. 
Proof. We prove the claim for any fixed n, X , P and F , namely that
is an achievable rate, the supremum then follows automatically. Notice that χ(P, F W ⊗n ) − χ(P, F V ⊗n ) is already an achievable rate for the classical-quantum channel (F W ⊗n , F V ⊗n ), and thus for all ǫ > 0 and all n ′ there exist an (n ′ , χ(P, F W ⊗n ) − χ(P, F V ⊗n ) − ǫ, ǫ) code {E m , D m } for (F W ⊗n , F V ⊗n ) as proven in the previous sections. It follows by construction and definition that E m F ⊗n ′ , D m is a (n ′ n, χ(P, F W ⊗n ) − χ(P, F V ⊗n ) − ǫ, ǫ) code for W with rate divided by n.
Since we can reduce the classical semantic secrecy capacity of quantum channels to the one of classical-quantum wiretap channels, we can restrict ourselves to the latter in our analysis.
We have proven that whenever strong secrecy is achievable, then semantic security is also achievable. However, the proof technique does not tell us how to practically construct such codes, and the subset of semantically secure messages chosen in Theorem 4.1 will in general depend on the channel and the code. In the next section we will address this issue and show how to construct such codes, similar to how hash functions are used to achieve strong secrecy.
Semantic Security with BRI Functions
As already mentioned above, the achievability proof in Section 4 is only an existence statement, and does not answer the question of how to choose the semantically secure message subsets. In this Section we introduce BRI functions and use them to construct semantic secrecy capacity achieving BRI modular codes in Theorem 5.12, thus also providing an alternative to the achievability proof of Theorem 4.1 in the previous section. We will construct such codes requiring common randomness, and will at first only show achievability via common-randomness BRI modular codes. An additional derandomization step will be required to construct codes without common randomness. The idea behind the construction of semantic-secrecy BRI modular codes is similar to the way in which strong secrecy codes are constructed, using first a transmission code to correct all the errors, but substituting the use of strongly universal hash functions with the use of BRI functions to erase the information held by the eavesdropper. Just like hash functions, BRI functions require a random seed known to the sender and receiver, which is why we provide it as common randomness. Providing the seed via common randomness makes construction easier and the proof conceptually clear. However, the assumption of common randomness as an additional resource is quite strong. In the end of the section we prove that the random seed can be generated by the sender and be made known to the receiver using the channel without sacrificing capacity, a process known as derandomization.
BRI functions
We will define define what biregular irreducible (BRI) functions are in this subsection, and prove the key properties that we will use to achieve semantic security. The properties we will prove are independent of communication problems like the classical-quantum wiretap channels we consider. They are simply related to the structure of BRI functions and how they are used as an input to classical-quantum channels. Thus the channels and the input spaces in this subsection are not to be confused with the actual wiretap channel and its inputs, as will be made clearer below.
We will be looking at families of functions f s (x), namely functions of two inputs f : S × X → N , and at their preimages in X For any biregular function f : S × X → N and any m ∈ M we can define a doubly stochastic matrix P f,m [48] with coefficients defined as
In other words, P f,m (x, x ′ ) is the normalized number of seeds s ∈ S such that both x and x ′ are in the preimage f −1 s (m). Since P f,m is stochastic, its largest eigenvalue is 1 and we define λ 2 (f, m) to be the second largest singular value of P f,m . Notice that d S and d X might depend on m. However, for the known BRI function construction these are indeed a constant parameter [48] .
Biregularity puts a strong restriction on the behaviour of the function. In particular, any m is a possible output of any s or x, with the right (s, x) pair. If for a fix m we consider the incidence matrix I sx = δ m,fs(x) , which we can think of it as representing the m section of the graph of f s (x), then we can visualize items a) and b) as I sx having the same number of 1's in each row, and similarly in each column. For example, ignoring definition 5.2 and omitting the zeros, a possible I sx for a given m might look like
with d S = 4 and d X = 3. An important consequence is the following relation
easily derived from
In [48] it was shown that for every d ≥ 3 and k ∈ N, there exists a BRI function f : S × S → M, satisfying |S| = 2 k d, |M| = 2 k and
For our constructions, the above is all we need to know, we will not need to know how these functions are constructed. The above are key features that are used to provide security. BRI functions play the equivalent role of hash functions for strong secrecy, so we need to show how they can be used to reduce the Holevo information at the output of the channel, which is what we will do in the remainder of the subsection. This channel must not be confused with the wiretap, which we will consider only later in the next subsection. For the rest of this subsection we fix a finite set X , a quantum system H, a classical-quantum channel
where V is not necessarily a wiretap, and the random variables S uniform random variable over the seed S M random variable over the message M which are always assumed to be independent. In the next subsection, V will actually be the composition of the encoder of the transmission code with the actual wiretap; thus X will be the message space of the transmission code. The space M will be the message space of the wiretap code and S the space of the common randomness. Given a seed s, the encoding of a message m happens by picking an uniformly random element of the preimage f −1 s (m). The definition of BRI functions and these conditions, then, are such that fixing the message and choosing the seed at random produces a uniformly random encoding, as will be explained now more precisely. For this pupose, with some abuse of notation, we will allow classical-quantum channels to take subsets as inputs, with the convention that the resulting state is the uniform mixture over the outputs of the elements in the set. Namely, for D ⊆ X we will define
in particular, the above defines
which we will repeatedly use. In particular, from Equation (38), stating that d X |X | = d S |S|, it follows immediately that
and thus for any m ∈ M
which means that not knowing the seed makes the output independent of the message.
We can now start bounding the information at the output of the channel V , and ultimately will need to be able to show the semantic secrecy conditions. As said, we focus for now on the common-randomness semantic security, Equation 
the equality holds because of Equation (2), where we consider the classicalquantum channel S × X → S(H ′ ) that maps (s, x) to V • f −1 s (m). It only remains to show that
but this follows immediately from Equation (41), namely from E S V • f −1 S (m) = V (X ), and the proof is concluded.
For the next step we will define subnormalized classical-quantum channels. Later we will project onto the typical subspace, and discard the rest.
Definition 5.4. Let ǫ ≥ 0. An ǫ-subnormalized classical-quantum channel V ′ : X → L(H) is a map satisfying V ′ (x) ≥ 0 and 1 − ǫ ≤ tr V ′ (x) ≤ 1, for all x ∈ X . Since for ǫ > ǫ ′ , an ǫ-subnormalized channel is also ǫ ′ -subnormal, we call all 0-subnormalized classical-quantum channels simply subnormal. Now let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. Let V ′ : X → L(H) be a subnormalized classical-quantum channel. We say that
The ordering definition reflects what we obtain when we project a channel on a subspace, we obtain a subnormalized channel that is less than the original channel in an operator ordering sense. When we project onto the typical subspace, we only change the channel a little, and we want to make sure that our upper bound only changes a little. This is the statement of the next lemma. 
Proof. Let ρ, ρ ′ , σ, and σ ′ be subnormalized quantum states on the same system such that the sum is a normalized state, namely so that tr(ρ + ρ ′ ) = tr(σ + σ ′ ) = 1. Consider classical-quantum states of the form |0 0| ⊗ ρ + |1 1| ⊗ ρ ′ and |0 0| ⊗ σ + |1 1| ⊗ σ ′ . By monotonicity of the relative entropy (cf. Section 2) under the trace, we note that
We define V ∆ := V − V ′ and apply the above to
Notice that
This implies that supp(V ∆ • f −1 s (m)) ⊂ supp(V ∆ (X )) and by operator monotonicity of the logarithm (cf. [13] 
where we used that tr V ∆ • f −1 s (m) ≤ ǫ. Plugging this into Equation (42), we obtain the claim. 
Lemma 5.6 is just the quantum version of Lemma 23 in [48] and can be shown by similar techniques. For the sake of completeness, we deliver a proof here.
Proof. By the ordering relation and the convergence of α-Rényi relative entropy for quantum states we mentioned in Section 2, it holds that D(ρ σ) ≤ D 2 (ρ σ), and thus we can bound any relative entropy term D(pρ qσ), where p and q are probabilities, and ρ and σ are states such that supp(rho) ⊂ supp(σ) with the 2-Rényi relative entropy as follows (notice that Equation (43) holds trivially if supp(ρ) is not in supp(σ)):
where we used −p log p ≤ 1 − p.
We apply this to
which gives
We apply the expectation value on both sides, and by the convexity of the exponential function we have
This concludes the proof. 
where λ 2 (f, m) is the second largest singular value of the P f,m defined in Equation (37) , and the expectation value is over uniformly random s ∈ S.
Proof. Recall that if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ) then exp D 2 (ρ σ) = tr ρ 2 σ −1 , where σ −1 is the pseudo-inverse. By linearity, the definition of the BRI function, and by expanding the mixtures, for every m we obtain
where we applied the expression of P f,m from Definition 5.2, and then Equation (38) . Let now ρ and σ be two states with supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ). Let {|v i } be an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors for σ and let ρ ij = v i | ρ |v j , then
Notice that supp(V (x)) ⊂ supp(V (X )) for all x, so we can apply this to the above. Let {λ i : i} be the non-zero eigenvalues of V (X ) with a set of orthonormal eigenvectors {|v i : i}. We now use the notation V ′ ij for the functions
are Hermitian, we have V ′ ij = V ′ * ji , and thus we can write
where |V ′ ij are complex vectors in C X . We now use the following well-known result (see, e.g., [22] ) (orignally stated for real vectors -see Lemma 5.9 for the generalization of the proof to complex vectors). P f,m is a symmetric stochastic matrix in an |X | dimensional real space with λ 2 (f, m) < 1 denoting the second-largest eigenvalue. By construction and assumption, 1 is the largest eigenvalue and it is simple (non-degenerate). Then, for any two vectors in ω and ω ′ in this space, it holds that
where |1 is the the normalized all-one vector, namely 1| = 1 √ |X | (1, . . . , 1).
We thus have
However, notice that by contruction,
because the choice of basis is an eigenbasis of V ′ (X ). We can thus simplify the expression to
We repeatedly use the cyclic property of the trace and tr AB ≤ A ∞ tr |B|, together with the positivity of the states, to obtain the following
Now we join everything together and obtain
as claimed.
Note that the bound in Lemma 5.7 is technically different from the classical version in [48, Lemma 26] , which bounds the leakage in terms of a max mutual information. As for now, we are only able to prove the lemma for finite dimensional quantum systems, while the classical version is valid also for infinite classical systems.
Remark 5.8. Using different type of functions instead of BRI functions, Hayashi and Matsumoto [31] show a lemma similar to Lemma 5.7 in the case of a single message (i.e., for resolvability) and for ordinary classical channels. It is straightforward to extend this to the case of several messages and subnormalized channels. The function class of Hayashi and Matsumoto is defined via the function inverses in terms of group homomorphisms. The example given in [31] , while efficiently computable, requires a longer seed than the best-known BRI function, which is not known to be efficiently computable.
For completeness, the proof of Equation (46) follows here. Afterwards, we will continue the chain of inequalities and bound the V dependent term of Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.9. Let P be a symmetric stochastic real matrix in a |X | dimensional complex space and let the eigenvalue 1 be simple. Denote the second-largest eigenvalue modulus P by λ 2 . For every vector |ω in this space, it holds
where |1 is the the normalized all-one vector, namely 1| = 1 √ |X |
(1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Notice that being doubly stochastic implies satisfying P |1 = |1 and 1| P = 1|. We first add and remove the |1 component from |ω :
because 1 is a simple eigenvalue, in the remaining subspace the largest eigenvalue is λ 2 . Since λ 2 is positive for such a matrix [22] , we have
Putting all the results above together we obtain the following single statement for BRI functions. 
Proof. Joining Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5 to 5.7, we obtain directly,
The result follows simply from log(1 + x) ≤ x/ ln 2.
In the next section we will finally define what a code using BRI functions looks like. The chain of lemmas above will allow us to prove that we can achieve capacity with such codes. There, the classical-quantum channels of the lemmas above will be the classical-quantum channel generated by a transmission code around the actual wiretap channel. So the V above should not be confused with the actual wiretap, but instead it will be the composition of the wiretap V ⊗n and the encoder. This is why all the lemmas above are single letter.
BRI modular codes
We can now prove the final statements. As will be noticed in the next proof, BRI functions are not used to upgrade the strong secrecy achieved by, e.g., a hash function or any strong-secrecy capacity-achieving code. Instead, the BRI functions replace hash functions and directly produce a semantic-secrecy capacityachieving code out of a capacity-achieving error-correction code.
Let us now fix an actual wiretap channel. We fix a finite space X , two finite quantum systems H and H ′ , and a classical-quantum wiretap channel (W, V ) defined as the classical-quantum channels W : X → S(H) and V : X → S(H ′ ). For reference, recall that an (n, |S|, |M|) common-randomness code is a finite subset {C s = {(E s m , D s m ) : m ∈ M} : s ∈ S} of the set of (n, |M|) codes, labeled by a finite set S, the common randomness. We then define BRI modular codes as follows.
Definition 5.11. Let S, and M be the finite sets for the space of the seeds, the messages and the encodings. Let {x n c , D c } c∈C be an (n, |C|) code for W , and let f : S × C → M be a BRI function. We define their BRI modular code to be the common-randomness code such that for every seed s ∈ S and message m ∈ M 1. the encoder E s m is the uniform distribution over x n c :
Notice that, in practice, for the decoder it will be more straightforward to simply decode c and then compute directly f s (c), instead of implementing the coarse grained decoding operators.
Theorem 5.12. For any probability distribution P over X :
1. there exist BRI modular codes achieving the semantic secrecy rate χ(P ; W )− χ(P ; V ) using codes achieving the transmission rate χ(P ; W ); 2. the same rate is achievable with their derandomized codes.
Notice that this theorem implies that the classical-quantum wiretap channel capacity can also be achieved with such modular codes, and thus in particular the second point of the theorem also provides an alternative proof for Theorem 4.1 with BRI scheme. Indeed, since the theorem holds for all P , we can also directly achieve the supremum. This single letter formula then implies the multi-letter formula by standard argument. More precisely, we can write the classical-quantum wiretap capacity as
Then the standard argument, which we reproduce in Lemma 5.13 for completeness, shows that if C 1 w is achievable by a class of codes, it automatically follows that C w is also achievable.
Proof. Fix the arbitrary distribution P , fix any ǫ > 0, and let δ be a positive number which will later be chosen as a function of ǫ. By [32, 42, 43] , there exists a γ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n, there exists an (n,
x ′ ∈ X ′ } for W whose rate is at least χ(P ; W ) − ǫ/2, whose maximal error probability is at most 2 −nγ , and whose codewords moreover are all δ-typical, namely the encoders satisfy E(T n P,δ |x ′ ) = 1 for all messages x ′ ∈ X ′ . (For the definition of T n P,δ , see Appendix A. For an explicit proof that the error can be made to decrease exponentially, see, e.g., [30, Lemma 4.1] ).
We have to find a suitable BRI function in order to ensure semantic security. By enlarging n if necessary, we have enough flexibility to choose integers k and d satisfying
As previously mentioned, we can choose BRI functions f : S ×S → M from [48] , satisfying |S| = 2 k d, |M| = 2 k and 
for any random variable M on M independent of the uniform seed S. We introduce a subnormalized classical-quantum channel V ′ : T n P,δ → L(H n ) by defining
For the definition of Π n P V,δ and Π n V,δ (x n ), see Appendix A.
for all x n ∈ T n P,δ . Since all codewords are contained in T n P,δ ,
is a 2 −nη(δ) subnormalized classical-quantum channel satisfying U ′ ≤ U , and Corollary 5.10 and Equation (51) imply
Since the inputs are chosen from a set of typical sequence T n P,δ , Lemma A.1 can be used to find
Inserting this and Equation (51) 
Since k is n times the rate of our common-randomness code, thus by Theorem 4.1 it cannot grow faster than nC w (W, V ), and thus
Now choose δ small enough for γ ′′ (δ) < ǫ/4 to hold. Then this upper bound tends to zero at exponential speed with n. Hence as the blocklength n increases, our BRI modular code {C s : s ∈ S} achieves the rate χ(P ; W ) − χ(P ; V ) with exponentially decreasing error probability and leakage.
As previously mentioned, the codes we constructed use common randomness. This allows us to simply provide the seed needed by the BRI modular code and keep the proof focused on the properties of the BRI function. We now derandomize these codes. Notice, however, that this is a standard procedure, and does not really depend on the structure of the BRI modular codes, but simply in the scaling of its size and errors.
We derandomize, as per Definition 3.8, the BRI modular code above. We set n ′ = n and share the seed with the same transmission code C ′ used to construct the BRI modular code. For the number of reuses of the seed we need to choose a sequence (N (n)) n∈N such that 1 ≪ N (n) ≪ 2 nγ , N (n) ≪ 2 n(ǫ/4−γ ′′ (δ)) , and N (n) ≪ (nC w (W, V ) + ǫ ′ + 1) −1 2 nγ . For simplicity it suffices to choose N (n) = n − 1 and thus we defineC as the n − 1-derandomized code constructed from C ′ and {C s : s ∈ S}. The total number of channel uses is then n 2 . By Equation (55) and Lemma 3.9 we have
The same argument as for the BRI modular code now works. Since δ was chosen to satisfy γ ′′ (δ) < ǫ/4, this upper bound still tends to zero with n, and our derandomized BRI modular code achieves the rate χ(P ; W ) − χ(P ; V ).
The following is the standard statement that any single letter achievable rate implies a multi-letter achievable rate. We give a proof for completeness.
where the maximum is over finite sets A and stochastic mappings E : A → X n , is also an achievable rate.
Proof. In order to show that C sem (W, V ) is also achievable given that C 1 (W, V ) is achievable, we pick any n and E. We obtain a new classical-quantum wiretap channel (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n ) for which we know that the rate C 1 (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n ) is achievable. Specifically, for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large n ′ , there exists an (n ′ , C 1 (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n )−ǫ, ǫ) code {E ′ m , D ′ m : m ∈ M} for (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n ). The error and leakage only depend directly on the encoder and channels compositions E(EW ⊗n ) ⊗n ′ and E(EV ⊗n ) ⊗n ′ , thus they do not change, and thus the code {E ′ m E n ′ , D ′ m : m ∈ M} is a (nn ′ , (C 1 (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n )−ǫ)/n, ǫ) code for (W, V ). Therefore C 1 (EW ⊗n , EV ⊗n )/n is achievable for (W, V ). Since the above holds for all n and E, taking the supremum concludes the proof.
In this section we showed that there exist modular coding schemes constructed from suitable transmission codes and BRI functions which achieve the security capacity of the classical-quantum wiretap channel and provide semantic security. Compared to the results of Section 4, the message sets of these modular codes are given explicitly via the BRI function. In particular, they do not depend on the wiretap channel.
Further Perspectives
In classical information, not only discrete channels, but also continuous channels are important subjects of study. In [48] semantic security was demonstrated for both discrete channels and continuous channels. Thus it will be very interesting to analyze if we can extend these results to continuous quantum channels. As mentioned above, the results of [48] show how a non-secure code can be transformed into a semantic secure code. Thus it will be a promising next step to analyze if these results can be extend to non-secure code for continuous quantum channels, e.g., classical-quantum Gaussian channels, which are continuousvariable classical-quantum channels undergoing a Gaussian-distributed thermal noise [34] . Furthermore, similar to the discrete channels, one can consider that the eavesdropper will have access to the environment's final state [41] for continuous quantum channels as well. Thus it will be an interesting further step to analyze if the results of Section 3.4 can be extended to continuous quantum channels. Further discussions will be the extension of these techniques on more complicated networks, e.g., arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. This is currently also still open for classical networks.
as the subspace spanned by |x n : x n ∈ T n P,δ , where |x n := n i=1 |x i . The orthogonal projector onto the δ-typical subspace is Π n ρ,δ =
x n ∈T n P,δ |x n x n | . and satisfies the following properties. There are positive constants α(δ), β(δ), and γ(δ), depending on δ such that for large enough n tr ρ ⊗n Π n ρ,δ > 1 − 2 −nα(δ) ,
2 n(S(ρ)−β(δ)) ≤ tr Π n ρ,δ ≤ 2 n(S(ρ)+β(δ)) ,
2 −n(S(ρ)+γ(δ)) Π n ρ,δ ≤ Π n ρ,δ · ρ ⊗n · Π n ρ,δ ≤ 2 −n(S(ρ)−γ(δ)) Π n ρ,δ .
Similarly let X be a finite set, and H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. For a ∈ X suppose V (a) has the spectral decomposition V (a) = j V (j|a)|j j| for a stochastic matrix V (·|·). The α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence a n is the subspace spanned by a∈X |j Ia , j Ia ∈ T Ia V (·|a),δ . Here I a := {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : a i = a} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence a n = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) for which the i-th symbol a i is equal to a ∈ X . The subspace is often referred to as the α-conditional typical subspace of the state V ⊗n (a n ). The orthogonal subspace projector which projects onto it is defined as Π n V,α (a n ) = a∈X j Ia ∈T Ia V (·|a n ),α |j Ia j Ia | .
For a n ∈ T n P,α there are positive constants β(α) ′ , γ(α) ′ , and δ(α) ′ , depending on α such that tr V ⊗n (x n )Π n V,δ (x n ) > 1 − 2 −nα ′ (δ) ,
2 n(S(V |P )−β ′ (δ)) ≤ tr Π n V,δ (x n ) ≤ 2 n(S(V |P )+β ′ (δ)) ,
2 −n(S(V |P )+γ ′ (δ)) Π n V,δ (x n ) ≤ Π n V,δ (x n )V ⊗n (x n )Π n V,δ (x n ) ≤ 2 −n(S(V |P )−γ ′ (δ)) Π n V,δ (x n ) .
For the classical-quantum channel V : X → S(H) and a probability distribution P on X we define a quantum state P V := a P (a)V (a) on S(H). Clearly, one can then speak of the orthogonal subspace projector Π P V,δ fulfilling Equations (57) to (59). For Π P V,δ there is a positive constant α(δ) ′′ such that for every x n ∈ T n P,δ , the following inequality holds:
Lemma A.1. Let V : X → S(H) be a classical-quantum channel. For any δ > 0 and probability distribution P over X , define the subnormalized classicalquantum channel V ′ : T n P,δ → L(H n ) by V ′ (x n ) := Π n P V,δ Π n V,δ (x n ) · V ⊗n (x n ) · Π n V,δ (x n )Π n P V,δ .
We assume that the inputs are chosen from a set of typical sequence T n P,δ with a probability distribution P and a positive δ. Then V ′ ≤ V ⊗n . Moreover, there exist positive η(δ) and γ ′′ (δ) such that if n is sufficiently large, V ′ is a 2 −nη(δ)subnormalized classical-quantum channel and rank[V ′ (X n )] max x n ∈T n P,δ V ′ (x n ) ∞ ≤ 2 nχ(P ;V )+nγ ′′ (δ) .
(65)
Proof. It is obvious that V ′ ≤ V ⊗n . To check that the trace of V ′ is close to 1, let x n ∈ T n P,δ and define V ′′ (x n ) = Π n V,δ (x n )V ⊗n Π n V,δ (x n ).
Clearly tr(V ′ (x n )) = tr(V ′′ (x n )) − tr (I − Π n P V,δ )V ′′ (x n ) .
By Equation (60), tr(V ′′ (x n )) ≥ 1 − 2 −nα ′ (δ) . Also, it is clear that V ⊗n (x n ) commutes with Π n V,δ (x n ) and that V ′′ (x n ) ≤ V ⊗n (x n ). Therefore
Altogether, if we set η(δ) = min{α ′ (δ), α ′′ (δ)}, we obtain that tr(V ′ (x n )) ≥ 1 − 2 −nη(δ) , so V ′ is a 2 −nη(δ) -subnormalized version of V ⊗n . Now we bound max x n ∈T n P,δ V ′ (x n ) ∞ . By Equation (62), for any x n ∈ T n P,δ we have V ′ (x n ) ≤ Π n V,δ (x n ) · V ⊗n (x n ) · Π n V,δ (x n ) (66)
thus implying that max x n ∈T n P,δ V ′ (x n ) ∞ ≤ 2 −n(S(V |P )−γ ′ (δ)) .
We finally bound the rank[V ′ (X n )]. By Equation (58) we have rank[V ′ (X n )] ≤ rank[Π n P V,δ ] = tr Π n P V,δ ≤ 2 n(S(P V )+β(δ)) .
We combine Equations (68) and (69) and obtain rank[V ′ (X )] max
x n ∈T n P,δ V ′ (x n ) ∞ ≤ 2 n(χ(P ;V )+β(δ)+γ ′ (δ)) .
